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Abstract The public health consequences of the conflict in Iraq will likely continue 
after the violence has subsided. Reestablishing public health security will require 
large investments in infrastructure and the creation of effective systems of gover-
nance. On the question of governance, the allocation of powers in the new constitution 
of Iraq is critical. Given the ease with which public health threats cross borders, the 
constitution needs to grant to the federal government the legal authority to manage 
such threats and simultaneously meet international requirements. Unfortunately, the 
draft constitution does not accomplish this objective. If politically possible, the consti-
tution should be amended to provide the federal government with this authority. If not 
possible, the Iraqi federal government would have two options. It could attempt to use 
alternative constitutional powers, such as national security powers. This option would 
be contentious and the results uncertain. Alternatively, the federal government could 
attempt to establish collaborative relationships with regional governments. Residual 
sectarian tensions create potential problems for this option, however. Reflecting on 
the Iraqi situation, we conclude that other federalizing countries emerging from con-
flict should ensure that their constitutions provide the federal government with the 
necessary authority to manage threats to public health security effectively.
The human consequences of the Iraq war have been enormous (Burnham 
et al. 2006; Alkhuzai et al. 2008). Although the majority of injuries and 
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deaths are related to intentional violence, Iraq’s damaged infrastructure 
is setting the stage for a public health crisis. Investment in infrastructure 
will be required to prevent such a crisis from occurring. However, this 
infrastructure alone will not be sufficient. The investment needs to be 
accompanied by appropriate governance systems that will complement 
efforts to ensure public health security in Iraq. The vision of a federal 
Iraq contained in the draft constitution supported by a large majority in 
a 2005 referendum, while having many merits, may create obstacles for 
achieving such security.
Iraq and Sudan are the most recent states with a history of violent 
domestic conflict to consider adopting a federal system of government. 
Others, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Pakistan, 
have already implemented federal systems, and still others, notably Sri 
Lanka, are considering federal solutions to internal conflicts (Forum of 
Federations 2007). An important consideration in the transition to feder-
alism in these countries is the constitutional allocation of public health 
powers between national and regional governments. As these countries 
emerge from conflict, coordinated responses between levels of govern-
ment will be a critical component of managing the public health chal-
lenges they will encounter.
Public health security, therefore, must be a priority in the design of new 
federal constitutions. However, tensions exist in assigning authority for 
public health security. Determining the optimal balance between national 
and regional authorities will be essential as these countries formalize their 
capacities to protect the health of their citizens. Iraq’s experience illus-
trates the challenges many federalizing countries face.
Constitutional Allocations of Powers 
Related to Public Health Security
Protecting the public’s security is a core function of the state and part 
of the “social contract” between the state and its citizens (Gostin 2001). 
Historically, the government’s role in preserving security has been viewed 
as protecting individuals from violence, whether domestic or external in 
origin. However, in the current era, certain public health threats such as 
pandemic influenza are also increasingly viewed as having a security 
dimension. Although definitions of “health security” and “public health 
security” vary (Fidler 2007), experts increasingly identify as security con-
cerns public health threats with the potential to disrupt significantly the 
normal functioning of societies. These threats tend to be communicable 
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disease threats (e.g., pandemics, bioterrorism) but can include noncom-
municable disease dangers triggered by accidental or intentional release 
of nuclear, radiological, or chemical agents.
As the World Health Organization (WHO) has asserted, providing for 
public health security requires providing for and maintaining measures to 
protect and preserve population health from such threats (WHO 2007). 
These measures include developing both the surveillance capacity that 
can identify threats at an early stage and the capacity to respond to these 
threats. Effective surveillance and response activities require the presence 
of robust human and public health resources and coordination of activities 
at all levels of governance.
The ability to provide for public health security is often a casualty of 
violent conflict. Countries that experience complex emergencies, includ-
ing civil strife, are susceptible to health crises emerging during and after 
the emergency (Spiegel et al. 2007). Damage to infrastructure, loss of 
housing, poor sanitation, and other factors increase the risk of the emer-
gence of new public health threats such as contaminated water and food 
systems and infectious disease outbreaks (Waldman and Martone 1999). 
In addition to direct health consequences, inadequate response to these 
threats by a newly formed government could undermine the population’s 
likely already fragile confidence in the government’s credibility, which 
could contribute to political instability.
Deciding on how to divide constitutional powers for achieving public 
health security is therefore a serious consideration for states considering 
federal systems of government. Unfortunately, in the past the constitu-
tions of federal countries have often been silent or vague on public health 
matters. This omission is understandable when one recognizes that some 
of these constitutions were created prior to a modern understanding of 
the science concerning the spread and control of public health threats. 
Nevertheless, the failure to allocate these powers has proven problematic 
in a modern era of public health science and governance (Wilson, McDou-
gall, and Upshur 2006). Indeed, pressures created by globalization and 
other developments are forcing many countries with federal governments 
to engage in de facto “federalization” of public health governance (Fidler 
2004a).
The new International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR2005, or regula-
tions), which entered into force in 2007, increase the need for newly fed-
eralizing countries to carefully consider the allocation of public health 
powers (WHO 2005a). The IHR 2005 draws a clear link between public 
health and global security (Fidler 2005). All WHO member states transi-
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tioning to federal systems of government will have to comply with the IHR 
2005, the provisions of which will require some centralization of public 
health governance functions. The regulations require countries to be able 
to detect, notify the WHO about, and respond to potential public health 
emergencies of international concern. In addition, countries must develop 
specified core surveillance and response capacities to prepare for potential 
public health emergencies of international concern (Fidler 2004b; Gostin 
2004). Although the regulations do not contain penalties for noncompli-
ance, failure by a country to notify the WHO about disease events that may 
constitute public health emergencies of international concern could result 
in the WHO issuing warnings about travel to the region which could have 
an adverse economic effect on the country in question (Fidler 2004b).
These demanding substantive provisions mean that the regulations will 
prove challenging for established federal countries to implement (Wilson, 
McDougall, and Upshur 2006). Implementation in newly federal countries 
emerging from conflict could be even more difficult, a problem that will 
only be made more challenging if the federal constitution is not created 
with recognition of these international legal obligations concerning public 
health security.
Potential Problem Areas Concerning Public 
Health Security and Federalism
Despite the importance of jurisdictional clarity concerning powers related 
to public health security, the assignment and exercise of these powers can 
be contentious or, alternatively, overlooked. Failing to address the divi-
sion of powers related to public health will be damaging when it comes 
to responding to public health emergencies and conducting local surveil-
lance for emerging public health threats. These two critical areas require 
as much jurisdictional clarity as possible and, if feasible, the creation of 
strong federal authority for assuring public health security.
Emergency Powers
One of the most contentious areas for a country emerging from civil con-
flict is determining how the federal government could declare a state of 
emergency and what powers it has when it does so. In addressing public 
health emergencies, a coordinated approach between federal and regional 
governments and local authorities is the best approach (Wilson 2006). 
However, for countries that are emerging from internal conflicts, the nec-
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essary levels of cooperation might be hard to produce and sustain. Even 
in developed countries, coordination of responsibilities in emergencies has 
been challenging, exacerbated by unclear constitutional authority among 
the various levels of government (Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs 2005).
For example, the constitutions of Canada, the United States, and Aus-
tralia do not provide clear authority to the federal government to man-
age emergencies (The State of National Governance Relative to the New 
International Health Regulations 2006). This problem occurred in Canada 
during the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, 
where communication and coordination between the levels of government 
was suboptimal (Campbell 2004). In the United States, the lack of clear 
federal authority to intervene was identified by some officials as a prob-
lem in the response to Hurricane Katrina (Stout 2005). In Australia, the 
commonwealth’s lack of emergency health powers had been noted as a 
potential limitation in its ability to combat a pandemic or manage a bio-
terrorism threat (Howse 2004).
The national governments of these countries subsequently took mea-
sures to address these gaps by utilizing different mechanisms within their 
constitutional structures to increase federal authority and enhance coop-
eration during emergencies. In the aftermath of SARS, Canada created a 
new public health agency and sought to establish more effective collabora-
tion between orders of government rather than pursue aggressive federal 
legislation (Wilson and Lazar 2005). The U.S. federal government has 
relied upon its funding power to place conditions on federal assistance to 
states for emergency preparedness (Pandemic and All-Hazards Prepared-
ness Act, Pub. L. No. 109 – 417 [2006]). Australia enacted new legislation 
based on federal security powers to enhance the commonwealth’s author-
ity to manage public health threats (Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia 2007).
From the perspective of citizens in established federal states, constitu-
tional restrictions on a central government’s authority to intervene during 
a public health emergency may seem unreasonable. Furthermore, such 
restrictions can lead to a highly paradoxical situation in which the WHO 
can declare a public health event to be a public health emergency of inter-
national concern under the IHR 2005, even when the event does not match 
the legal criteria to be considered a national public health emergency and 
thus does not fall under federal jurisdiction (WHO 2005b). To illustrate, 
during the SARS outbreak in Canada, the federal government could not 
declare a public welfare emergency without the permission of the province 
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of Ontario. However, if the IHR 2005 had been in force at the time of 
this event, the international outbreak would have likely been considered a 
public health emergency of international concern.
From the perspective of political groupings and interests in newly feder-
alized or federalizing states, the limitations on federal authority are some-
what more understandable. In particular, allocation of powers to regions 
can work to protect the rights and interests of populations in those regions 
from political domination or discrimination by the central government. 
Even in established federal states, the need to protect minority populations 
through federalism has at times remained a concern. For example, in Can-
ada the federal use of the War Measures Act to curtail civil liberties in the 
province of Quebec during the 1970 October Crisis was criticized by some 
as unnecessary and out of proportion to the threat. In newly federaliz-
ing states, the utilization of federal emergency powers could be perceived 
as a pretext for federal government intervention in regional government 
affairs, thus functionally recreating a unitary state without the protections 
federalism may provide for minority populations (Wilson 1995).
Surveillance
Public health surveillance involves a complex series of linked activities 
related to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of data linked to 
specific outcomes, and for this reason, it is unlikely to be mentioned in 
the constitution of a federal state. Therefore, jurisdictional authority over 
health surveillance will have to be inferred from other powers that have 
been constitutionally allocated. Surveillance, however, is an essential 
component of public health and is critical to every country’s ability to 
identify threats at an early stage and take measures to control their spread. 
Surveillance is particularly important for countries emerging from con-
flict. Effective measures to control the spread of disease are not possible 
without early detection of potential outbreaks (Valenciano et al. 1999). 
However, surveillance in conflict regions is difficult, as has been noted 
in Iraq (Valenciano et al. 2003). Useful surveillance depends on timely 
local collection of data, and it requires evaluation and verification at the 
regional level. In the event of a serious or spreading emergency, it needs 
action at the federal levels and possibly at the international level, as is 
contemplated by the IHR 2005 (Baker and Fidler 2006).
Moreover, for surveillance to be most effective, countries need to stan-
dardize how it is done. Apart from the infrastructure and logistical chal-
lenges, postconflict countries may also encounter federal challenges to 
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effective surveillance. Regional governments may be hesitant about allow-
ing the level of monitoring by a central government required to ensure 
harmonized surveillance practices. Perhaps regional governments may 
fear that such oversight could erode their autonomy and encroach upon 
individual rights. Regional governments may have apprehensions that data 
they transfer to the central government will be used by the central govern-
ment in a manner that infringes upon other areas of regional jurisdiction 
or may be released to the public or other authorities in ways that could 
be damaging to the affected region. Such problems and conflicts over the 
sharing of information between regional and central governments were 
identified by WHO officials as a critical problem in the management of 
the SARS outbreak (Wilson, McCrea-Logie, and Lazar 2004; Alphonso 
and York 2003).
Public Health Challenges Facing  
a New Iraqi Federation
Beyond the ongoing violence, the population of Iraq faces numerous 
threats to its health. Recent estimates from the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs indicate that large segments 
of the Iraqi population do not have access to clean water and appropriate 
hygiene and sanitary conditions. A 2007 UNICEF estimate found that 
only one in three children under five have access to safe drinking water 
(United Nations Security Council 2007). Rates for standard pediatric 
immunizations have also been found to be in decline (WHO 2006; Ni’ma 
et al. 2003). Evidence of the toll of poor water safety and sanitation can 
be found in the 2007 cholera outbreak in Iraq, which resulted in approxi-
mately 4,500 laboratory-confirmed cases and twenty-two deaths (WHO 
Representative’s Office in Iraq 2007). The WHO issued statements con-
cerning the nature and extent of this outbreak and advised neighboring 
states “to reinforce their active surveillance and preparedness systems” 
(WHO 2007).
When hostilities cease, reestablishing the conditions necessary for pub-
lic health security must be a priority of the new government. Emerging 
from the first Gulf War and the ensuing economic sanctions, Iraq expe-
rienced large cholera outbreaks and marked increases in infant mortality 
(Ascherio et al. 1992). A coordinated response to prevent serious public 
health events from damaging fragile political, economic, and social con-
ditions will require federal leadership both in terms of investment in the 
local public health infrastructure and in terms of communicating emerg-
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ing health risks to regions. It will also require considerable effort at the 
local public health level. This task applies not only to Iraq but also to the 
international community because of the possible spread to other countries 
of threats emerging in Iraq.
Federalism and Iraq
A federal solution is one mechanism by which the rights of geographically 
situated ethnic and religious groups in Iraq can gain some measure of auton-
omy and protection, while the integrity of Iraq as a whole and the advan-
tages of shared governance can be preserved (Brancati 2004). A federal 
solution, however, has many obstacles to overcome, and each predominant 
sectarian group has a considerable stake in the design of a federation.
The sectarian divisions within Iraq are both ethnic, between the Arab 
majority and the Kurdish minority, and religious, between the Shia Arab 
majority and the Sunni Arab minority. The Kurdish region has the great-
est interest in a highly decentralized federation (Brancati 2004). The Shia 
majority, in contrast, would prefer a more cohesive, centralized federation. 
The decentralized nature of the draft constitution has led to accusations 
from the Shia majority that the constitution implements a form of soft par-
tition (Bruno 2007). While having a desire to have its autonomy protected 
through a federal solution, the Sunni minority could lose access to oil rev-
enue in a decentralized state because Iraq’s oil is found predominantly in 
the Kurdish north and Shia south (Anderson 2005). Regional powers also 
have much at stake in the design of the Iraqi federation. Turkey, in par-
ticular, would view suspiciously a federal solution that provides a strong, 
autonomous Kurdish region, although it would view this more favorably 
to the alternative of an autonomous Kurdish state.
Despite the approval by an overwhelming majority in a 2005 referen-
dum, debate continues in Iraq on the draft constitution. Recognizing the 
long process of establishing an effective federal state, a clause in the con-
stitution outlines a mechanism for modifications (Article 137). Based on 
this clause, a panel has been created to oversee changes to the constitution 
with a focus on federal matters (Abdul-Zahra 2006).
The Iraqi Constitution and Public Health Security
Whatever the outcome of Iraqi revision of the constitution, cooperation on 
public health security among Iraq’s regions and political factions will be 
essential. Given the mutual vulnerability all groups in Iraq face from the 
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transmission of disease, public health security may be an area on which 
Shia, Sunni, and Kurds could agree in terms of the nature of the Iraqi fed-
eration. Even regions with established public health infrastructure remain 
vulnerable if adjacent regions fail to adequately manage the emergence 
of public health threats, which can rapidly cross political boundaries and 
borders. Nevertheless, such agreement is not guaranteed, and sectarian 
tensions may prevent the requisite collaborative relationships from form-
ing. The constitutional allocation of responsibility for public health secu-
rity will, therefore, be a critical component in determining the effective-
ness of the new Iraq government’s ability to protect the health security of 
its population. The federal government will need to have some authority 
over matters related to public health security.
According to the draft Iraqi constitution, the constitution is the supreme 
law of the country (Article 13, Final Draft Iraqi Constitution 2005). Health 
is clearly an important component of the draft Iraqi constitution (appendix 
A), which includes multiple references to health, including a reference to 
“health security” in Article 30. The draft constitution, in a section titled 
“Economic, social, and cultural liberties,” indicates that health is a right 
of every Iraqi citizen, and further stipulates that the state is responsible for 
public health and for providing “the means of prevention and treatment 
by building different types of hospitals and medical institutions” (Article 
31). In addition, the Iraqi state must “guarantee to the individual and the 
family — especially children and women — social and health security and 
the basic requirements for leading a free and dignified life” (Article 30). 
The use of “health security” in this provision does not, however, refer 
to the concept of “public health security” as employed in this article but 
instead connects to the health component of social security and welfare 
schemes. Thus, Article 30 does not provide a robust basis for arguing for 
strong federal authority to address public health security threats.
Health and environmental protection are considered shared jurisdic-
tions in the draft Iraqi constitution (appendix B). Importantly, however, the 
constitution specifically states that powers not explicitly allocated to one 
or another order of government in the constitution fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the regions (Article 111). Further, in areas that are not exclusively 
federal, regional legislation takes precedence (Article 117). Therefore, on 
the surface at least, the constitution does not appear to provide the federal 
government with sufficient authority to coordinate Iraq’s response to a 
national public health emergency or its compliance with the IHR 2005. 
This could clearly prove to be problematic in the immediate postconflict 
period if existing public health problems worsen.
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Modifying the Iraqi constitution to provide the federal government with 
the necessary authority over public health security should therefore be 
strongly considered. The federal government will require explicit author-
ity over the following: access to surveillance data; the ability to coor-
dinate the creation of surveillance infrastructure; the ability to oversee 
public health emergency response; and, perhaps, the ability to intervene 
in a public health emergency if concern exists about transmission of the 
emergency to other regions or internationally.
However, if express federal authority for public health security is not 
politically possible, the Iraqi federal government would have to consider 
other alternatives to address a public health security threat arising in one 
of the regions. The federal government may seek to obtain the necessary 
authority from areas of the constitution that are under exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. These areas include authority for signing international agree-
ments (Article 107) and “forming and executing national security pol-
icy” (Article 107). However, whether internal health security falls within 
“national security policy” is unclear (Brown 2005).
The federal government could utilize the power to declare a state of 
emergency to intervene in public health emergencies, although the consti-
tution refers to this power primarily in the context of war (Article 57). The 
Iraqi constitution also presumably provides the federal government with 
taxation power (authority over fiscal and customs policy) and, therefore, 
the capacity to use its spending power to direct policy (Article 107). The 
federal government could offer financial incentives, in the form of con-
ditional grants, to provide rewards for regional cooperation with public 
health objectives. The Iraqi constitution also provides the federal govern-
ment with the authority to regulate “commercial policy across regional and 
governorate boundaries in Iraq” (Article 107). The U.S. federal govern-
ment, for example, has the power to regulate international and interstate 
commerce under the commerce clause, and the federal government has 
exercised its commerce clause authority to regulate matters of interstate 
commerce affecting public health.
The Iraqi constitution potentially provides mechanisms by which the 
federal government could exercise authority for public health surveil-
lance. The draft constitution provides that “the Iraqi National Intelligence 
Service shall collect information, assess threats to national security, and 
advise the Iraqi government” (Article 9). A very liberal interpretation of 
this clause might allow for federal-level surveillance to preserve public 
health security, but supporting such an interpretation would be problem-
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atic because public health surveillance is most effectively undertaken by 
public health authorities, not intelligence agencies.
Human rights provisions in the draft Iraqi constitution may also provide 
some basis on which the federal government could exercise its authority to 
conduct public health surveillance. Threats to public health security con-
stitute threats to the life of citizens of Iraq, and the constitution obliges the 
Iraqi state to protect, among other rights, the right “to enjoy life, security 
and liberty” (Article 33). However, resorting to a human rights justifica-
tion for federal authority and action on public health security may worry 
the regions because such a justification could have potentially very broad 
application across every area of policy, not just public health.
Federal action in the realm of public health that is based on unclear con-
stitutional authority and that regions may perceive as infringing on their 
constitutional competencies is a less-than-ideal way of addressing threats 
to public health security. It might not be supported by the courts, and it 
also might inflame political opinion. Another option would be for the fed-
eral government to pursue strong collaborative arrangements with regional 
governments (Wilson et al. 2008). These arrangements could include the 
use of memoranda of understanding or agreements outlining conditional 
funding strategies between the federal and regional governments. In terms 
of collaboration on funding, the federal government could invest in the 
surveillance capacity of local public health systems in exchange for guar-
anteed access to public health data of national or international concern. In 
fact, a clause in the constitution requires the federal government to provide 
sufficient funding so as to allow regional governments to carry out their 
functions (Article 117). However, regional governments may not view con-
ditional funding as a benign exercise but rather an attempt to expand fed-
eral power through the authority to tax and spend (Telford 2003).
Whatever approach the federal government takes to centralize public 
health activities will have to be cognizant of the political risks associ-
ated with such efforts. The Kurdish region in particular may object to 
any increased centralization, no matter how rational and necessary such 
centralization seems from a neutral policy perspective. However, the risks 
presented to the Kurdish region by inadequate public health security in 
adjacent non-Kurdish regions and in neighboring countries provide a com-
pelling argument for Kurdish leaders to concede that the federal govern-
ment needs to be able to act effectively in the realm of public health. 
No level of Kurdish autonomy will protect the Kurdish population from 
transnational disease threats in the age of globalization.
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Conclusion
The draft Iraqi constitution will determine the mechanisms by which the 
Iraq federal government establishes public health security for its popula-
tion. The Iraqi situation also illustrates some of the dilemmas inherent in 
constitutional allocations of powers concerning public health for newly 
federalizing states. In protecting the autonomy of regions, the Iraqi con-
stitution has limited the federal government’s ability to intervene to pro-
tect the larger population from public health threats. To manage emerging 
public health threats and to meet international requirements, the federal 
government may have to resort to powers likely not explicitly intended for 
public health. However, the consequences of such an approach are uncer-
tain and, at worst, may be destabilizing.
In the immediate postconflict period, the Iraqi federal government may 
resort to declarations of emergency to address threats to public health 
security that appear to be beyond the capacity of regional governments to 
contain. While federal intervention to control a spreading public health 
threat would likely be viewed in a completely different light from federal 
military intervention to preserve domestic security, the use of broad emer-
gency powers for public health purposes could, however, fuel regional 
government suspicions and be perceived as an abuse of federal authority 
and a threat to the autonomy of regions. A potentially less provocative 
option would be to utilize the use of spending/appropriation powers to 
enhance the federal role while acknowledging the important link between 
investment in local capacity and national public health effectiveness. 
Regional governments could still view this strategy with suspicion, see-
ing it as a way for the federal government to extend its jurisdiction and 
weaken regional autonomy. In any case, the federal government will need 
to have the necessary authority to conduct public health surveillance and 
ensure adequate responses to public health emergencies. With ongoing 
deliberations on the content of the draft constitution, an opportunity exists 
to reexamine the distribution of powers related to the objective of public 
health security.
Other countries considering federal constitutions will likely encoun-
ter similar challenges to those facing Iraq. Defining a clear federal role 
for preserving public health security in new constitutions should be con-
sidered. Ideally, a federal government should have (1) access to public 
health surveillance information, (2) the authority to oversee public health 
emergency responses, and (3) where public health events threaten to cross 
regional or national borders, the authority to intervene. The existence of 
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such federal powers would improve the chances for achieving domestic 
public health security and for facilitating compliance with international 
legal obligations under the IHR 2005. Furthermore, clear and specific 
allocation of public health powers will reduce the need to use broader 
emergency powers for the purpose of managing public health threats as 
well as other powers not specifically intended for public health purposes. 
Addressing the challenge of public health security forthrightly in the 
design of federal constitutions constitutes the best strategy for enabling 
governments to meet their fundamental responsibility of protecting and 
providing for the health of their citizens.
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Appendix A:  
Health “Guarantees” in the Iraq Constitution1
Article 30
First: The state2 guarantee to the individual and the family — especially 
children and women — social and health security and the basic require-
ments for leading a free and dignified life. The state also ensures the above 
a suitable income and appropriate housing.
Second: The State guarantees the social and health security to Iraqis in 
cases of old age, sickness, employment disability, homelessness, orphan-
age or unemployment, and shall work to protect them from ignorance, fear 
and poverty. The State shall provide them housing and special programs 
of care and rehabilitation. This will be organized by law.
Article 31
First: Every citizen has the right to health care. The state takes care of 
public health and provide the means of prevention and treatment by build-
ing different types of hospitals and medical institutions.
Second: Individuals and institutions may build hospitals or clinics or 
places for treatment with the supervision of the state and this shall be 
regulated by law.
Article 32
The State cares for the handicapped and those with special needs and 
ensure their rehabilitation in order to reintegrate them into society. This 
shall be regulated by law.
Article 33
First: Every individual has the right to live in a safe environment.
Second: The State undertakes the protection and preservation of the envi-
ronment and biological diversity. Every individual has the right to enjoy 
life, security and liberty. Deprivation or restriction of these rights is pro-
1. This text is reproduced verbatim from the draft Iraqi constitution (Final Draft Iraqi Con-
stitution 2005), found at the UNESCO Web site. Other translations of the constitution exist with 
a different total number of articles and differences in article numbering.
2. “State” refers to the government of Iraq.
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3. This text is reproduced verbatim from the draft Iraqi constitution (Final Draft Iraqi Con-
stitution 2005), found at the UNESCO Web site. Other translations of the constitution exist with 
a different total number of articles and differences in article numbering.
hibited except in accordance with the law and based on a decision issued 
by a competent judicial authority.
Appendix B: Allocation of Powers over  
Health in the Iraq Constitution3
Potential Sources of Federal Authority
Article 9
D. The Iraqi National Intelligence Service shall collect information, assess 
threats to national security, and advise the Iraqi government. This service 
shall be under civilian control and shall be subject to legislative oversight 
and shall operate in accordance with the law and pursuant to the recog-
nized principles of human rights.
Article 57
Ninth: A. To consent to the declaration of war and the state of emergency 
by a two-thirds majority based on a joint request from the President of 
the Republic and the Prime Minister. B. The period of the state emer-
gency shall be limited to 30 days, extendable after approval each time. C. 
The Prime Minister shall be authorized with the necessary powers that 
enable him to manage the affairs of the country within the period of the 
state of emergency and war. A law shall regulate these powers that do not 
contradict the constitution. D. The Prime Minister shall present to the 
Council of Representatives the measures taken and the results within the 
period of declaration of war and within 15 days of the end of the state of 
emergency.
Article 107
The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the following 
matters:
First: Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiat-
ing, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiat-
ing, signing and ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign sovereign 
economic and trade policy;
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Second: Formulating and executing national security policy, including 
creating and managing armed forces to secure the protection, and to guar-
antee the security of Iraq’s borders and to defend Iraq;
Third: Formulating fiscal and customs policy, issuing currency, regulating 
commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq; 
drawing up the national budget of the State4; formulating monetary policy, 
and establishing and administering a central bank. . .
Potential Limitations to Federal Authority
Article 110
The following competencies shall be shared between the federal authori-
ties and regional authorities:
Third: To formulate the environmental policy to ensure the protection of 
the environment from pollution and to preserve its cleanness in coopera-
tion with the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region.
Fifth: To formulate the public health policy in cooperation with the regions 
and governorates that are not organized in a region.
Article 111
All powers not stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal gov-
ernment shall be the powers of the regions and governorates that are not 
organized in a region. The priority goes to the regional law in case of 
conflict between other powers shared between the federal government and 
regional governments.
Article 117
First: The regional authorities shall have the right to exercise executive, 
legislative, and judicial authority in accordance with this constitution, 
except for those powers stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal 
government.
Second: In case of a contradiction between regional and national legis-
lation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive powers of the federal 
government, the regional authority shall have the right to amend the appli-
cation of the national legislation within that region.
4. “State” refers to the government of Iraq.
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Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the 
national revenues sufficient to discharge its responsibilities and duties, but 
having regard to its resources, needs and the percentage of its population.
Fifth: The Regional Government shall be responsible for all the admin-
istrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and 
organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, 
security forces and guards of the region.
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